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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
between the conflicting interests of consumers and creditors,
that the drafter felt they had achieved, remains to be seen.
One thing is clear; in order for the Oklahoma U3C to op-
erate to the benefit of consumers they must become an in-
formed consumer public, aware of their rights and remedies,
and above all educated to be effective consumers.
William D. Nay
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS IN PROFESSIONAL ATHLETICS
'The rise in popularity of professional sports has made it
an extremely lucrative field of endeavor for both the owner-
promoter and the profssional athlete. The foundation, with-
out which professional sports could not survive and on which
it depends for its continued success, is the contract between
the performing athlete and the one who contracts for his
services. This article will deal with the breach of that
contract and the availability of specific performance to force
compliance with its provisions.
When a party fails to live up to his contractual obliga-
tions, the only available remedy at law for the injured party
is an action for damages suffered as a result of that breach.
Often these damages are either not ascertainable or the
remedy is inadequate and not as cumplete as could be at-
tained by a decree of specific performance. Traditionally,
specific performance has been considered an extraordinary
remedy for breach of contract, but the liberalized trend to-
day leans more in the direction of giving the parties what
they actually bargained for.
As a general rule courts of equity will not decree specific
performance in personal service contracts.1 Among the rea-
See RESTATEMET OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1932), entitled Con-
tracts for Personal Service, which states: "A promise to
[Vol. 6, No. I
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sons cited for this rule are that services under compulsion
usually do not produce the results the parties intended, and
that it would be impossible for the courts to supervise and
render personal service or supervision will not be specifi-
cally enforced by an affirmative decree."
Comments c, d and e to § 379 state:
c. Among the many varieties of personal serv-
ice contracts to which the rule of the Section ap-
plies are those requiring performance as an actor,
a singer, a sales-agent, a ball-player, a teacher, a
mechanic, a valet, a cook, a railway gate-tender, a
personal custodian of children. Among the contracts
that are included are all contracts of employment
creating the intimate relation of master and serv-
ant; the latter's performance is personal service
and that of the former frequently involves per-
sonal supervision.
d. The refusal of affirmative specific enforce-
ment in these cases is based in part upon the dif-
ficulty of enforcement and of passing judgment up-
on the quality of performance, and in part upon
the undesirability of compelling the continuance of
personal association after disputes have arisen and
confidence and loyalty are gone. In some cases the
decree would seem like the enforcement of an in-
voluntary servitude.
e. There may be negative promises in personal
service contracts; within certain limits these may
be specifically enforced by injunction (see § 380);
R STATKMET OF CONTlAcTs § 380 (1932) entitled En-
forcement of Negative Duties that accompany Affirma-
tive Promises, which states:
(1) An injunction against the breach of a con-
tractual duty that is negative in character may
be granted either
(a) to prevent harm for which money damages are
not an adequate remedy caused by the breach
of the negative promise itself, even though
there are accompanying affirmative promises
by either party that will not be specifically en-
forced, unless such partial enforcement will
lead to unjust or harmful results; or
19691
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insure the proper performance of the contract.2 Furthermore,
it has been hid to a form of involuntary servitude, because
it interfers with personal liberty thus violating public policys
and the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.4
If the party to perform under the contract has, or the
services contracted for require, merely ordinary skill and
ability, then it can be argued that the injured party could go
into the open market 'and obtain similar services of like
kind and quality and then proceed at law for the damages
incurred as a result of the- breach. In this situation his remedy
(b) as an indirect mode of specifically enforcing
an accompanying affirmative promise, if it is
likely to be effective for that purpose and if
the affirmative provise is itself one that would
be enforced by affirmative decree except for
the mere practical difficulties of such enforce-
ment.
(2) A contract to render personal service exclu-
sively for one employer will not be indirectly
enforced by injunction against serving another
person, if
(a) the employer is not ready and willing to con-
tinue to perform his part of the contract; or
(b) performance of the contract will involve per-
sonal relations the enforced continuance of
which is undesirable; or
(c) the injunction will leave the employee with-
out other reasonable means of making a liv-
ing; or
(d) the service is not unique or extraordinary in
character.
Comments g, h and i to § 380 state:
g. . . . In personal service cases, an injunc-
tion should practically never be used primarily
as an indirect means of enforcing the affirmative
promises; it should be restricted to cases where
the breach of the negative promise will in itself
cause irreparable harm.
h. An injunction to enforce even the nega-
[Vol. 6, No. I
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at law would be adequate and complete; thus an action for
specific performance probably would not lie.
However, if the services are of a special, unique and
extraordinary nature and of such a character as to make
substitution impossible, then clearly there is no adequate
remedy at law and an equitable solution can be considered.
tive duty will generally be refused if its effect is
substantially to prevent the employee from mak-
ing a living in his accustomed vocation, the single
alternative being the perpetuation of undesirable
personal relations with an employer or other per-
sons with whom he is in serious conflict. This
would come near to the creation of an involuntary
servitude. To justify the granting of an injunc-
tion, it should appear that the employer is ready
and willing to continue the employment in good
faith and that the employer is not being substan-
tially forced back into the old employ. Here again
is a case for the exercise of sound judicial discre-
tion. Among the matters to be given special con-
sideration are the character of the service to be
rendered, the probability of renewal of good rela-
tions, the degree of inadequacy of other remedies,
and the hardship involved in the enforcement
by injunction.
i. If the service that is involved is not unique
or extraordinary, the breach is not likely to cause
harm for which damages are not adequate. This
is especially true with respect to the injury caus-
ed by serving another employer in competition
with the plaintiff. Service may be unique and ex-
traordinary because of special knowledge of the
plaintiff's customers and business methods as
well as by reason of special skill possessed by
the employee.
J. Parks, Equitable Relief in Contracts Involving Persona!
Services, 66U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1918).
2 DeRivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige 264 (N.Y. 1883).
3 Wakeham v. Barker, 82 Cal. 46, 22 P. 1131 (1889).
4 See G. CLAIK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 71 (1924); W. DEFUNIAx,
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQuITY 165 (1956).
19691
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In this area Lumley v. Wagner5 is the landmark case and
provides the basis for the rule that where a contract for
personal services of a special, unique and extraordinary
nature contains a negative covenant stating that similar serv-
ices will not be rendered for another during the contract
term, equity courts will specifically enforce the negative
covenant.
The leading case in the United States comparable to the
Lumley case is McCaull v. Braham.6 In that case the de-
fendant, Lillian Russell, contracted to sing exclusively under
the management of the plaintiff for one year. Subsequently,
while her contract with the plaintiff was still in effect, she
contracted to sing for another person. The court issued a
decree restraining the defendant from performing for any-
one other than the plaintiff during the period covered by
the contract.
The Lumley-McCaufl doctrine was applied, at least by
dicta, to professional sports in several 1890 baseball cases.7
A new baseball league had induced several players to breach
their contracts with the existing league and play for it. The
clubs which had those players under contract sought in-
junctions restraining them from playing for anyone else dur-
ing the period covered by their agreements. Though all of
these early decisions went against the plaintiff clubs, this
was not a repudiation of the LumZey rule. In fact, the courts
felt that professional athletes were amenable to the rule and
that the court had both the right and the power to enforce
the negative covenants in the contracts.8 In one of those cases,
1 De G., M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
6 16 Fed. 37 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
7 For a history of baseball and the law, see Note, Baseball
and the Law-Yesterday and Today, 32 U. VA. L. REV. 1164
(1946).
8 Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup.Ct.
1890).
(Vol. 6, No. I
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the court made the following analogy:
Between an actor of great histrionic ability and a
professional base-ball player, of peculiar fitness and
skill to fill a particular position, no substantial dis-
tinction in applying the rule laid down . . . can be
made. Each is sought for his particular and peculiar
fitness, each performs in public for compensation,
and each possesses for the manager a means of at-
tracting an audience. The refusal of either to perform
according to contract must result in loss to the man-
ager, which is increased in cases where such services
are rendered to a rival.9
The courts in these early cases refused to grant the in-
junctions on the basis of a lack of mutuality concerning the
reserve clauses. The following is representative of the clause
in question:
17. It is further understood and agreed that the
said party of the first part [club] may at any time by
giving the party of the second part [player] ten days'
notice of its option and intention so to do, to end and
determine all its liabilities and obligations under this
contract, in which event, upon the expiration of said
ten days, all liabilities and obligations undertaken by
said party of the first part in this contract shall at
once cease and determine, and said party of the sec-
ond part shall thereupon be also freed from his
obligation hereunder, and shall have no claim for
wages for any period after said ten days.
18. It is further understood and agreed that the
said party of the first part shall have the right to
'reserve' said party of the second part for the season
next ensuing the term mentioned in paragraph 2
herein provided; and said right and privilege is here-
by accorded the said party of the first part upon the
following conditions, which are to be taken and con-
strued as conditions precedent to the exercise of
such extraordinary right or privilege, namely:
not be reserved at a salary less than that mentioned
I. That the said party of the second part shall
9 Id. at 780-81.
1969]
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in the 20th paragraph herein except by consent of
the party of the second part;
II. That the said party of the second part, if he
be reserved by the said party of the first part for
the next ensuing season, shall be one of not more
than fourteen players then under contract. 0
The courts construing these clauses felt that they were in-
equitable and lacked mutuality because the club could hold
a player to his contract for a year or more while the player's
hold over the club was limited to 10 days.1
A contract that is sought to be specifically en-
forced must be mutual both as to remedy and the
obligation. A party not bound by the agreement itself
has no right to call upon a court of equity to enforce
specific performance against the other contracting
party by expressing his willingness in his bill to
perform his part of the agreement. His right to the
aid of the court does not depend upon his subsequent
offer to perform the contract on his part, but upon
its original obligatory character. 12
While all these cases uniformly held that the performer
had to possess special, unique and extraordinary ability in
order for specific performance to be available, it was con-
ceded that the requirement was met by the fact that the
performer was a professional athlete for whose services two
rival clubs were vying. That point was not conceded, how-
ever, in Columbus Baseball Club v. Reiley,13 where the court
denied the injunction ruling that the player involved did not
possess such special, unique and extraordinary skills and
10 Id. at 781-83, quoting pertinent contractual provisions from
the contract between the Metropolitan Exhibition Club and
John Ward dated April 23, 1889.
11 Id. at 784. See also Metropolitan Exhibition Club v. Ewing,
42 Fed. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890); Philadelphia Ball Club,
Ltd. v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C.C. 57 (1890).
12 9 N.Y.S. at 784.
13 11 Ohio Dec. 272 (1891).
[Vol. 6, No. I
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therefore did not meet the criteria of the Lumley rule. The
court in its opinion stated:
Professional baseball has become a business, and
and should be treated as any other business, with no
greater consideration and no less; and if the court
undertook to exercise its jurisdiction in this particular
case, unless this player were conceded to be an ex-
traordinary and unique player, there would be ground
for exercising its jurisdiction in almost every case of
a contract for personal services, which, I think, would
be something not only extraordinary in the history
of jurisprudence, but something which no one would
claim that the court ought to undertake.' 4
The leading case, and the one that is most often cited for
the proposition that specific performance is available against
a professional athlete, is Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. 'V.
Lajoie.15 Napoleon Lajoie was one of early baseball's lead-
ing stars. The club claimed that he had special, unique, and
extraordinary skills which the club would be unable to re-
place, and that his loss would cause the club irreparable
injury. The court in discussing that aspect of the case ob-
served:
He has become thoroughly familiar with the
action and methods of the other players in the club,
and his own work is peculiarly meritorious as an in-
tegral part of the team work which is so essential.
In addition to these features which render his services
of peculiar and special value to the plaintiff, and not
easily replaced, Lajoie is well known, and has great
reputation among the patrons of the sport, for ability
in the position which he filled, and was thus a most
attractive drawing card for the public. He may not
be the sun in the baseball firmament, but he is cer-
tainly a bright particular star. We feel therefor,
that the evidence in this case justifies the conclusion
that the services of the defendant are of such a unique
character, and display such a special knowledge, skill,
14 Id. at 275.
15 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
19691
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and ability, as renders them of peculiar value to the
plaintiff, and so difficult of substitution that their
loss will produce "irreparable injury," in the legal
significance of that term, to the plaintiff.10
The court having disposed of that issue took up the
question of mutuality, an insurmountable hurdle to the grant-
ing of injunctions in many previous cases. The court stated:
We are not persuaded that the terms of this con-
tract manifest any lack of mutuality in remedy. Each
party has the possibility of enforcing all the rights
stipulated for in th agreement. It is true that the
terms make it possible for the plaintiff to put an end
to the contract in a space of time much less than
the period during which the defendant has agreed to
supply his personal services; but mere difference in
the rights stipulated for does not destroy mutuality of
remedy. Freedom of contract covers a wide range of
obligation and duty as between the parties, and it
may not be impaired, so long as the bounds of rea-
sonableness and fairness are not transgressed. 17
The court in refusing to dissolve the lower court's in-
junction said that: "Substantial justice between the parties
requires that the court should restrain the defendant from
playing for any other club during the term of his contract
with the plaintiff".'8
In 1914 a series of cases involving these same issues came
before the courts again. The cases all recognized that equity
had the jurisdiction to enjoin the violation of a negative
covenant if the player possessed a special, unique and ex-
traordinary skill which could not be readily replaced.
i0 Id. at 974.
17 Id. at 975. But see, Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116
Fed. 782 (1902), decided subsequent to Lajoie, in which the
court held the lack of mutuality of the reserve clause fatal
to the granting of injunctive relief.
18 Id. at 976.
[Vol. 6, No. I
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Some of these new cases19 followed the Lajoie decision
and rationale finding that the parties were free to contract
and that there was adequate consideration. However, the
majority of the cases held that the contracts involved lacked
mutuality and therefore could not be specifically enforced.
In American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase20 the
court in discussing mutuality said:
The plaintiff can terminate the contract at any
time on 10 days' notice. The defendant is bound to
many obligations under the remarkable provisions of
the National Agreement. The Player's Contract exe-
cuted in accordance with its terms, binds him, not
only for the playing season of six months from April
14th to October 14th, but also for another season, if
the plaintiff chooses to exercise its option, and if it
insists upon the requirement of an option clause in
each succeeding contract, the defendant can be held
for a term of years. His only alternative is to abandon
his vocation. Can it fairly be claimed that there is
mutuality in such a contract? The absolute lack of
mutuality, both of obligation and of remedy, in this
contract, would prevent a court of equity from mak-
ing it th basis of equitable relief by injunction or
otherwise.2 1
The question of mutuality was raised again in Long
Island American Association Football Club, Inc. v. Manrodt.22
In organizing a football club for its first season of play, the
plaintiff had spent months negotiating to procure the best
possible players for its team. Two of the players signed for
the 1940 season were Manrodt and one Lene. When they
subsequently signed to play with the New York Yankees
19 Eg., Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 Fed. 269
(E.D.Mo. 1914).
20 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1914). See also Weeg-
ham v Killefer, 215 Fed. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914); Cin-
cinnati Exhibition Co. v. Johnson, 190 Ill. App. 630 (1914).
21 149 N.Y.S. at 14.
22 23 N.Y.S. 2d 858 (Sup.Ct. 1940).
19691
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professional football team, the Long Island Club sought an
injunction restraining them from playing with anyone other
than the plaintiff during the 1940 season.
The defense contended first that Manrodt and Lene did
not possess such extraordinary and unique ability as to make
them irreplaceable; and second that the contract could not
be enforced due to a lack of mutuality.2 In determining the
question of unique skill and ability the court felt that con-
sideration ought to be given to the special factors and prob-
lems involved in the organization of a new football team.
It reasoned that once the team had signed the players, trained
them in their system, molded them into an effective unit
dependent upon certain individuals to make it go, it would
be very difficult to replace key players after the season be-
gan. These considerations, plus the fact that once the season
began all the good football players would already be under
contract to some other football club, led the court to set
aside the first defense contention.
In disposing of the second argument, lack of mutuality,
and granting the injunction restraining the ballplayers from
playing for anybody but the Long Island Club during the
1940 season, the court noted that:
Mutuality of obligation was not lacking for the
prowislon for no-f-c makes the contract binding on the
plaintiff at least until notice is given [cases cited].
---There is no requirement of mutuality of remedy.
"What equity exacts today as a condition of relief is
the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate
without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or
o defendant [citing cases]. Mutuality of remedy is
,,important in so far only as its presence is essential to
.the attainment of that end. The formula had its
This defense was predicated on the following clause con-
tained in the contract: "This contract may be terminated
at any time by the Club upon three (3) days' written notice
to the player." 23 N.Y.S. 2d at 860.
[V7ol. 6, No. I
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origin in an attempt to fit the equitable remedy to
the needs of equal justice. We may not suffer it to
petrify at the cost of its animating principle" [cita-
tion omitted].24
The issue of what constitutes special, unique and ex-
traordinary skills was again raised in Winnipeg Rugby Foot-
ball club v. Freeman.25 The defendants completed their col-
lege eligibility and signed with Winnipeg, a Canadian Foot-
ball League team. Subsequently, they also signed a contract
to play for the Cleveland Browns of the National League.
Winnipeg then brought an action to restrain the players
from playing for Cleveland. This case involved neither an
option nor a reserve clause and the issue was quickly nar-
rowed to whether or not the defendants were players of
such unique and extraordinary ability so as to make them
amendable to a decree of specific performance.
The defendants had been good college players and were
good professional prospects but were not proven players
of unique and extraordinary skill in the professional ranks.
The court, taking that into consideration, stated:
The standard of special skill and exceptional
ability to some extent must have a relation to the
class and character of play.
I am satisfied that to the Winnipeg Club and for
the character of the game as played in the Canadian
League... that the two players had special skill and
exceptional ability.26
The court continued and in effect broadened the defini-
tion of unique and extraordinary skill and ability when it
stated:
In view of the acknowledged difference between
college and professional football, and even between
the Canadian League and the current National League,
it seems reasonable to observe that appraisal of skill
24 23 N.Y.S. 2d at 860.
2r 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio 1955).
26 Id. at 366.
19691
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and unique ability of a player, as they relate to con-
tracts of this type, must depend somewhat upon his
prospects and potential. Otherwise such a contract
with a college football player seldom would stand up
for the professional club that first signed him.27
The applicability of using injunctive relief against a
league player of average ability was tested in Dallas Cow-
boys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris.28 The defendant, Harris,
had played for the Los Angeles Rams during the 1958 season.
After a controversy with the club, arising in part out of the
option clause in his contract, he decided to sit out the 1959
season. He returned to the University of Oklahoma to com-
plete his degree and while there was employed as an assist-
ant football coach by the University. Harris signed a con-
tract to play for the Dallas Texans of the rival American
Football League for the 1960 season, whereupon Los Angeles
assigned his contract to the Dallas Cowboys who exercised
the option to have Harris play for them for one year. The
Cowboy's attempt to secure an injunction against Harris
failed in the lower court because of the jury's determination
that Harris did not possess exceptional and unique knowledge,
skill or ability as a football player and therefore was not
amenable to a decree of specific performance. The club
appealed and took the position that he did possess such
skills and furthermore that Harris was estopped from deny-
ing that he had no unique knowledge, skills and ability as
a football player because of his express representations that
he did possess them in his contract.29 The court denied this
27 Id.
28 348 S.W. 2d 37 (Tex. 1961).
29 The 1958 contract between Harris and the Los Angeles Rams
provided in part:
8. The Player hereby represents that he has special,
exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability as a
football player, the loss of which cannot be estimated with
any certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compen-
sated by damages and therefore agrees that the Club shall
[Vol. 6, No. I
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contention on the ground that for estoppel to attach the state-
ment relied on must have been one of a material fact and
not merely an expression of opinion as in this case.
Taking up the question of whether or not Harris pos-
sessed unique and exraordinary skills, the court heard testi-
mony which showed that while Harris was not a star, and
that there were players of equal or better ability in the
league, players of Harris' ability were difficult to find and
not available to the club. The court reversed the jury's
finding as to Harris' skill and ability and granted the in-
junction restraining Harris because it felt that the construc-
tion given the word unique had been too narrow and limited.
In support of a more liberal interpretation the Harris court
quoted a statement from Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie:30
We think, however, that in refusing relief unless
the defendant's services were shown to be of such a
character as to render it impossible to replace him he
has taken extreme ground. It seems to us that a more
just and equitable rule is laid down in Pom. Spec.
Perf. p. 31, where the principle is thus declared:
"Where one person agrees to render personal services
to another, which requires and presuppose [s] a special
knowledge, skill and ability in the employe[e] so
that in case of a default the same service could not
easily be obtained from others, * * * its performance
will be negatively enforced by enjoining its breach
* *." We have not found any case going to the
[same] length of requiring, as a condition of relief,
proof of the impossibility of obtaining equivalent
service.31
have the right, in addition to any other rights which the
Club may possess, to enjoin him by appropriate injunction
proceedings against playing football or engaging in activi-
ties related to football for any person, firm, corporation or
institution and against any other breach of this contract ....
348 S.W. 2d at 42.
80 See note 15 supra.
80 348 S.W. 2d at 44 (emphasis by the court), quoting, Phila-
delphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
19691
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In Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett 2 the
court was again called upon to determine what constituted
unique and extraordinary skill. While Barnett was not a
rookie out for the team, neither was he the established star
and drawing card that Lajoie was. Barnett had played for
the Syracuse Nationals of the established National Basket-
ball Association during the 1960-61 season. The following
season he signed to play for the Cleveland Pipers of the new
American Basketball League. The Syracuse Nationals exer-
cised their option and the instant law suit resulted.
The defense principally based its case on two points. The
first, reminiscent of the mutuality question, was that the op-
tion clause in the contract called for perpetual service ond
was, therefore, void.33 The plaintiff countered this allegation
with the argument that the option clause entitled the club
to the defendant's services only for one extra year. The court
held for the plaintiff on this point stating:
If the language of a contract is susceptible of two
32 181 N.E. 2d 506 (Ohio C. P. 1961).
83 The option clause in Barnett's contract provided:
22. (a) On or before September 1st (or if a Sun-
day, then the next preceding business day) next fol-
lowing the last playing season covered by this contract,
the Club may tender to the Player a contract for the
term of that season by mailing the same to the Player
at his address following his signature hereto, or if none
be given, then at his last address of record with the
Club. If prior to the November 1 next succeeding said
September 1, the Player and the Club have not agreed
upon the terms of such contract, then on or before 10
days after said November 1, the Club shall have the
right by written notice to the Player at said address
to renew this contract for the period of one year on
the same terms, except that the amount payable to
the Player shall be such as the Club shall fix in said
notice; provided, however, that said amount shall be
an amount payable at a rate not less than 75% of the
rate stipulated for the preceding year. 181 N.E. 2d
at 509.
[Vol. 6, No. 1
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constructions, one of which will render it valid and
give effect to the obligation of the parties, and the
other will render it invalid and ineffectual, the form-
er construction must be adopted.34
The second defense contention was that Barnett was not
a player of unique and extraordinary skill and ability. Testi-
mony received at the trial showed that Barnett ranked 19th
in the League in scoring but he was not among the players
selected for the East-West All Star game, nor was he named
in the U.S. Basketball Writers All-NBA team for 1961.
The court considering the testimony, both club's eager-
ness to employ his services, and the defendant's contractual
representations,3 stated:
Whether Barnett ranks with the top basketball
players or not, the evidence shows that he is an out-
standing professional basketball player of unusual at-
tainments and exceptional skills and ability, and that
he is of peculiar and particular value to the plaintiff.36
84 181 N.E. 2d at 509-10.
8 Barnett's contract with the Syracuse Nationals provided
in part:
9. The Player represents and agrees that he has
exceptional and unique skill and ability as a basket-
ball player; that his services to be rendered hereunder
are of a special, unusual and extraordinary character
which gives them peculiar value which cannot be rea-
sonably or adequately compensated for in damages
at law, and that the Player's breach of this contract
will cause the Club great and irreparable injury and
damage. The Player agrees that, in addition to other
remedies, the Club shall be entitled to injunctive and
other equitable relief to prevent a breach of this con-
tract by the Player, including, among others, the right
to enjoin the Player from playing basketball for any
other person or organization during the term of this
contract. 181 N.E. 2d at 508-09.
The contract Barnett signed with the Cleveland Pipers had
substantially the same provision in section 12.
86 181 N.E. 2d at 514.
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The court went on to say that:
Professional players in the major baseball, foot-
ball, and basketball leagues have unusual talents and
skills or they would not be so employed. Such play-
ers, the defendant Barnett included, are not easily
replaced.
The right of the plaintiff is plain and the wrong
done by the defendant is equally plain, and there is
no reason why the Court should be sparing in the
application of its remedies.
Damages at the law would be speculative and
uncertain and are practically impossible of ascertain-
ment in terms of money. There is no plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law and the injury to the
plaintiff is irreparable.37
The result reached in Connecticut Professional Sports
Corporation v. Heyman33 shows clearly that the issue of mu-
tuality is not settled. Art Heyman, after a great collegiate
basketball career at Duke University, twice failed to secure
a contract to play in the NBA. He co d6-atedtWpy with
the-Hartford Capitals of the Eastern Professional League for
the 1966-67 season and was the Capital's star and the League's
highest scorer. When Heyman learned that the American
Basketball League was being formed, he signed a contract
to play for the New Jersey Americans during the 1967-68
season for $15,000, which was considerably more than
he made playing for Hartford. Hartford exercised their op-
tion and commenced suit to restrain Heyman from playing
for anyone else during the period covered by their contract.
The only real issue that had to be resolved was the question
of mutuality. The court, citing Winnipeg Rugby Football Club
v. Green3 0 and Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie40 among oth-
ers, admitted that in similar circumstances other courts had
granted injunctive relief. Nevertheless, the court said that
37 Id. at 517.
38 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
39 See note 25 supra.
40 See note 15 supra.
[V'ol. 6, No.1'
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in New York "each case is sui generis and decisions hinge
upon a careful analysis of the contractual terms".41 After a
careful analysis of the contract 42 the court did not grant the
injunction, stating:
The primary reason for denying relief is the fact
that the plaintiff seeks to enforce a contract that pur-
ports to bind defendant for a one year period and at
the same time permit plaintiff to terminate at will.
While this court does not adhere to a wooden mu-
tuality rule, the existence of a provision entitling
plaintiff to end the contract whenever it chooses is
an important factor in determining whether injunc-
tion relief is appropriate.43
41 276 F. Supp. at 620.
42 Paragraph 2 of the contract provided:
That for the consideration above mentioned, the
club shall have the option or right to renew this con-
tract with all its terms, provisions and conditions for
another period of one year, provided, however, that
the rate of salary shall be such as the parties may
agree upon, or in default of agreement, such as the
club shall fix; and the player hereby agrees to perform
similar services and be subject to all the obligations,
duties and liabilities prescribed in this contract for
the period or periods of such renewal, including the
rate of salary fixed by the club in the event the salary
rate cannot be fixed by agreement of the parties, pro-
vided only that written notice of the exercise of such
option of renewal be served upon the player prior to
August 31, 1967. 276 F. Supp. at 619.
Paragraph 1 provided:
That the club may at any time after the beginning
and prior to the completion of the period of this con-
tract, give written notice of its option and intention
to end and terminate all of its liabilities and obliga-
tions of the club shall cease and terminate immedi-
ately. The playear (sic) shall thereupon be freed and
discharged from his obligations hereunder, shall have
no claim for salary or other compensation thereafter,
and shall be free to negotiate a new contract for him-
self with any other club in the league. Id. at 619-20.
43 276 F. Supp. at 621.
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It is well settled today that injunctive relief is available
to restrain and prevent an athlete from performing for an-
other team or person in violation of his contractual obliga-
tions. In the years of litigation, the cases have usually turn-
ed upon the resolution of two basic issues. The first, which
requires a determination of what constitutes possession of
unique and extraordinary skill so as to make a person amen-
able to an injunction, today appears to be conclusively set-
tled. The courts have given "unique and extraordinary skill"
such a broad interpretation that for all practical purposes
it includes all those athletes who have signed a professional
contract.44
The second basic issue upon which the courts have found-
ed their decisions is that of mutuality involving reserve and
option clauses. The preponderance of the cases have upheld
the validity of these contracts as not lacking mutuality. The
court's decision in the Heyman case points out, however, that
this question is not entirely settled.
The courts have realized that t h e entire professional
sports structure is based upon a contractual foundation. With-
out some means of enforcing these contracts, the entire struc-
ture would certainly be shaken and weakened. Since it would
be virtually impossible to determine with any degree of cer-
tainty the financial harm caused by a player's breach of con-
tract, an action at law for damages would be difficult to
maintain. Without a doubt, if a baseball team lost a twenty-
game winning pitcher, a football team lost its quarterback,
44 But see Safro v. Lakofsky, 238 N.W. 641 (Minn. 1931), where
the court held that a boxer sought to be enjoined was not
amenable to injunctive relief because there was nothing
to show that he had any peculiar skill or prowess or even
any promise whatever. The court felt that the plaintiff
could easily replace the defendant and therefore was not
irreparably damaged.
[Vol. 6, No. I
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or a basketball team lost its leading scorer, the team would
be hard-pressed to repeat the success of a preceding year. A
decline in league standings in any professional sport is us-
ually paralleled by a decline in attendance, resulting in a
monetary loss to the club. There are too many variables in-
volved, however, for a club to directly relate the breach of
contract to a specified amount of damages, thus virtually
eliminating an action at law for damages. An argument might
be made that the risk of proof of loss should be borne by
the wrongdoer, in this case the breaching athlete.
This is the position that the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken in anti-trust cases 45 in order to allow plaintiffs to main-
tain an action for damages despite the fact that they could
not prove a specific amount of damages. It is very doubtful,
however, that the courts will subscribe to this argument since
that decision was necessary to effect the purpose of the anti-
trust laws- an overriding Congressional policy not present
here.
A provision for liquidated damages in the event of a
breach would not solve the problem either, for no "reason-
able" amount of damages would adequately compensate a
club for the loss of one of its stars or even one of its regu-
lars. Even if the liquidated damages were set at relatively
high figure, a club in a rival league would be more than
happy to pay it in order to get an established player to jump
leagues. Yet the club losing the player still might not be ade-
quately compensated.
Another argument that a club could raise is that the con-
tract gives the club the player's services for one season and
not just the right to enjoin his performance for another club
for one year. This argument undoubtedly would be of no avail
because it is too restrictive. It would leave the athlete no
recourse other than to abandon his profession if he did not
- Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
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desire to play for the club he had contracted with, and it is
unlikely that the courts would go that far.40
Thus it appears that the only feasible, and the most equit-
able solution for both players and clubs is the present method
of enjoining the breach of contract. The player can breach
his contract if he wants to, sit out of competition for one year,
and then play for another club the following year. Most ath-
letes, however, are reluctant to pay the price - giving up
one full season out of a relatively short competitive year -
thus the injunction appears to be enough of a deterrent in
most cases to stop him from breaching his contract.
Peter J. Bosch
46 See Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Boxers Machen and Johansson had signed for a match on
the condition that if Machen lost, Johansson would give
him a rematch before he fought anyone else in the United
States or before he fought the champion, Floyd Patterson,
anywhere in the world. That was the interpretation of the
contract urged upon the court by the plaintiff, Machen,
when he sought to enjoin Johansson from fighting Pat-
terson for the Heavyweight Championship in New York,
but the court denied the injunction saying:
I find that the instant covenant, even as interpreted
by plaintiff is not enforceable by injunction for
two reasons:
(1) It is not reasonable in its terms;
(2) The granting of an injunction would in-
flict serious injury on the defendant, while
not providing the plaintiff with the protec-
tion he seeks. Id. at 530.
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